SIDESHOW NO LONGER:  
A HISTORIOGRAPHICAL REVIEW
OF THE GUERRILLA WAR

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In 1956, Bruce Catton lamented that historians had treated the Civil War’s guerrilla conflict as a “colorful, annoying, but largely unimportant side issue.” No one seemed to hear him. Some twenty years later, Emory M. Thomas described the exploits of even the best known and most effective Confederate guerrillas as “more or less side shows,” which led a frustrated Phillip Shaw Paludan, writing a decade after Thomas, to repeat Catton’s concern more forcefully: “A systematic study of this irregular war is needed.” In truth, that would have been difficult in the late 1980s, but a torrent of books, articles, and dissertations about irregular operations during the Civil War has poured out since then. Using this body of work as a foundation, it may now be possible to tackle Paludan’s daunting assignment. Recent research has suggested that the guerrilla war, far from being a sideshow, was a crucial part of the larger war. It influenced strategic thinking among both soldiers and politicians. It touched the lives of untold numbers of southern civilians and their communities. In much of the South, it was more than just part of the larger war; it was the war itself, a war with its own rules, its own chronology, its own policies, its own turning points, its own heroes, villains, and victims. In the end, it altered the nature of the entire conflict to a startling degree.¹

Historical treatment of the guerrilla war has passed through three phases during the past half century. In the 1940s and 1950s, writers focused on the exploits—mostly heroic and romantic—of famous guerrilla leaders, such as John


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Singleton Mosby and William Clarke Quantrill. Their choice is understandable. The Civil War meant battles and leaders during those decades, Gettysburg and Vicksburg, Robert E. Lee and Ulysses S. Grant defined the limits of popular interest in the war. The same could even be said of most historians, for while politics and diplomacy held some sway in academic circles, few authors explored the complex economic and social dynamics of warfare. Nor did scholars have—or at least express—a very realistic conception of war. The story of the Civil War was a tale of liberal democracy triumphant, and the battles that determined its outcome were portrayed as noble contests waged by honorable men inspired by a patriotic muse. Even Bell I. Wiley's books about Johnny Reb and Billy Yank and Dudley T. Cornish's work on African American soldiers, while breaking away from the heroes and leaders and serving as harbingers of a brand of military history soon to become fashionable, presented sanitized versions of the lives of volunteer soldiers in conventional armies.²

Nor did these scholars concern themselves with definitions, a subject that requires comment before proceeding. We call it the guerrilla war, and that expression will do as long as one appreciates the rocks and shoals it disguises. The word guerrilla, as is generally known, dates from the Spanish war of resistance against Napoleon Bonaparte in the early nineteenth century. It became grounded in American usage during the Mexican War, and while colorful Americanisms like bushwhacker and jayhawker became popular alternate names during the Civil War, all were absorbed by guerrilla. So, too, the more precise partisan, ranger, and raider designations used by Confederate and Union officials to distinguish between government-sanctioned irregular troops attached to the conventional armies and the independent and frequently predatory bands that waged war on their own.

The distinction between guerrillas and partisans is useful—indeed, essential—at a certain level of inquiry, for it does define two different styles of irregular operations. Represented by Quantrill and Mosby, respectively, practitioners of those two styles were often poles apart in their approaches to warfare, their public images, and their treatment by northern and southern authorities. In these respects, irregulars and irregular warfare are probably better terms to encompass the variety of activities that defined the guerrilla war. Yet the more colorful guerrilla has become so embedded in usage—just as the Civil War has triumphed over the War Between the States and the War of the Rebellion—that it will likely never be dislodged. Indeed, it has been used consistently throughout the twentieth century to define modern irregular operations.

Given this imprecision and initial lack of interest in the subject, Jay Monaghan's *Civil War on the Western Border: 1854–1865* attracted a surprising amount of attention when it appeared in 1955. Here was no ordinary account of

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the war. Not only did Monaghan describe events hundreds of miles away from the eastern theater, which regretfully still defines the geographical interest of most students of the war, but some of his most prominent characters were jayhawkers and bushwhackers. Monaghan described traditional set-piece battles, like Wilson's Creek, Pea Ridge, Prairie Grove, and Centralia, but even there, he showed how irregular forces played important roles in the story. These guerrillas were a complex crowd, too, at once romantic and repulsive. They dashed at their enemies with pistols blazing, but they also terrified defenseless civilians, looted homes, and burned towns.\(^3\)

Monaghan’s characters—people like Quantrill, James H. Lane, James Montgomery, and William “Bloody Bill” Anderson—were not unknown. The published memoirs of guerrillas, oral tradition, and accounts of the guerrilla war by local amateur historians ensured that this aspect of the conflict had never faded from public memory. As James C. Malin wrote in his review of Monaghan’s book, these southern and northern irregulars had become “legendary.” Yet legendary, to Malin’s way of thinking, was not good. It meant that these men had never been treated in a balanced, scholarly way. Indeed, Malin’s chief criticism of Monaghan’s “popularized history,” with its “conspicuously . . . subjective element,” was that Quantrill and “other controversial characters” continued to “haunt these pages in much their legendary forms.”\(^4\)

Malin may have been too harsh, but he had a point. Nearly all previous work on Civil War guerrillas and most of what followed before the 1950s used a biographical approach, with authors tending to cast their subjects as quixotic adventurers. In that respect, the focus on battles and leaders still held sway, although the guerrilla war had created a very different pantheon. As early as 1931, novelist Andrew Lytle had written an admiring biography of Nathan Bedford Forrest, who, while never a guerrilla in the purest sense, certainly employed irregular tactics. Robert Selph Henry published a more satisfactory Forrest biography in 1944, the same year that Virgil C. Jones completed a biography of Mosby. Thurman Sensing tackled Champ Ferguson, a Tennessee guerrilla in the Quantrill mold, but all these authors fashioned their works as fast-paced adventures. The same could be said of the biographers of Meriwether Jeff Thompson, John Hunt Morgan, and Quantrill in the 1950s.\(^5\)

The two most popular guerrilla books of the 1950s departed from the biographical norm to some extent, but they still concentrated on the leaders. Equally


important, they did not stray far from the "legendary" elements so decried by Malin. Yet when Virgil Carrington Jones' *Gray Ghosts and Rebel Raiders* and Richard S. Brownlee's *Gray Ghosts of the Confederacy* appeared in 1956 and 1958, respectively, they made clear that the Civil War was more complex than even military historians had realized—or at least acknowledged. "It is hardly going too far to say," Bruce Catton emphasized in the introduction to Jones' book, "that one cannot understand the course of the Civil War in the Eastern theatre without digesting Mr. Jones' account of the guerrillas." Catton stressed the eastern theater because, in fact, Virginia and Maryland formed the limits of Jones' interest. Brownlee's book was also limited geographically, for even though his subtitle advertised the guerrilla war in "the West," he, in fact, wrote largely about Quantrill and Missouri. Still, what these two pioneers did they did well, and one reviewer congratulated Brownlee for his "dignified scholarship."6

Yet the writing of history is a fluid craft. Trends and phases are rarely bound by strict chronological limits, so that even as the exploits of guerrilla leaders captured public imagination, the 1940s and 1950s also witnessed a broadening of scholarly inquiry. Even in this earliest phase, one can see the beginning of an evolving field of guerrilla studies.

First, graduate students began to consider the role of guerrillas when writing about military strategy. As early as 1941, Ethelbert C. Barksdale hit the mark most squarely with a doctoral dissertation at the University of Texas entitled "Semi-Regular and Irregular Warfare in the Civil War." Barksdale could not shake the dominant personalities and leaders, but he discussed both East and West and included such unheralded "semi-irregulars" as Sterling Price, John A. Wharton, and Joseph O. Shelby and hitherto obscure "irregulars" like Sidney D. Jackman, Marcellus Clarke (a.k.a. "Sue Munday"), and Kinch West. He also reached some conclusions about the value of guerrilla warfare to the Confederacy, a point that over the years would prove to be the most contentious aspect of the subject. For his part, Barksdale believed that most guerrillas were undisciplined and unreliable, as much a handicap as a help to the Confederacy. Thomas A. Belser's 1958 Vanderbilt dissertation on military operations in Missouri and Arkansas did not deal exclusively with guerrillas, but it provided a thoughtful explanation for the heavy reliance on irregulars by the Confederacy in those two states. Somewhat discouragingly, Belser concluded that the guerrilla conflict was so complex, so bitter, and so lacking in documentation that to tell its "complete story" was "patently impossible."7

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7 Ethelbert C. Barksdale, "Semi-Regular and Irregular Warfare in the Civil War" (Ph.D. diss., University of Texas, 1941), 402-3; Thomas A. Belser Jr., "Military Operations in Missouri and Arkansas, 1861-1865" (Ph.D. diss., Vanderbilt University, 1958), 587. See also Robert M. Boykin, "Guerrilla Warfare in the Borderlands During the Civil War" (M.A. thesis, North Texas State University, 1956).
Albert Castel, a native Kansan who completed his doctoral studies at the University of Chicago in 1955, took a more comprehensive approach. His dissertation, published in 1958 as *A Frontier State at War: Kansas, 1861–1865*, compensated for any lack of attention Monaghan, who had leaned more toward Missouri in his rendition of the border war, may have paid Castel’s native state. The battle between Jayhawkers and Missouri bushwhackers remained the core of his story, but Castel went beyond those narrow constructs to describe with considerable balance and authority the political and social milieu of the border war. “The author has ably demonstrated the amazing degree to which the military events shaped the political developments of frontier Kansas,” said Robert W. Johannsen in his review of the book.8

In another welcomed development, historical journals made space for the guerrilla war. Most of the resulting articles continued to concentrate on individual guerrillas, but they could, nonetheless, be quite thoughtful. They introduced lesser known irregulars, such as Sue Munday of Kentucky and Sol Street and William Falkner of Mississippi. They even, on occasion, moved beyond ambushes and lynchings to explore the question of who sided with whom in the guerrilla struggle between unionists and secessionists for control of the home front. Taking a more theoretical tack, Virgil Jones ruminated about the difficulties he had encountered in researching the guerrilla story. Sources were scarce, declared Jones, a conclusion with which all subsequent researchers would heartily agree.9

But the most telling shift, one tied intrinsically to changes in modern warfare, came in a search for historical relevance. In light of the crucial role played by partisan operations in World War II and the way in which such operations had become increasingly important in the “limited” wars of an atomic age, civilian and military historians alike began looking for historical lessons and searching for the roots of partisan combat. In 1958, Virgil Ney, the army’s ranking authority on irregular warfare, pointed to over a dozen countries that had been engulfed by guerrilla conflicts since World War II. “One of the most pressing problems confronting the military establishments of the Western allies springs from the West’s relative lack of experience in coping with guerrilla strategy,” asserted Ney.10

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Among Civil War historians, Bruce Catton and Virgil Jones had suggested the value of such analysis, but the most successful early search for the practical military lessons of the war came from Carl E. Grant, an army colonel who had served in North Africa and Italy during World War II. Grant had little interest in "legendary" guerrilla leaders. His 1958 article, "Partisan Warfare, Model 1861–1865," did not mention a single bloody encounter. Rather, Grant evaluated the guerrilla conflict from the strategic perspective of Confederate wartime political and military leaders. In examining the reasons that led the Confederacy first to endorse and then to reject the use of partisan forces, Grant showed that the guerrilla war was more than a series of random, unconnected violent episodes.11

More to the point, Grant explained how the Union army had defeated the Confederacy’s guerrillas. Finding their lines of supply and communications vulnerable to rebel raids, Grant said, the Federals had responded by living off the land and the civilian population. He also emphasized the Union’s retaliatory program against rebel guerrillas and the role of unionist irregulars far beyond the Kansas–Missouri border. "[T]he field commander of the future with his widely dispersed units and installations may well find himself confronted with area defense and security problems not unlike those posed to his Union counterparts of a century ago by the hit-and-run tactics of the Confederate partisans," noted Grant. That, he said, was the lesson of the guerrilla war.12

This slight but necessary body of early work set the stage for a second phase of guerrilla studies in the 1960s and 1970s. The "new" phase did not ignore older concerns, approaches, or themes, which continued—and still continue—to attract both researchers and readers. But the next two decades broadened the scope of research, enhanced the sophistication of the field, and improved the quality of scholarly inquiry.

As if on cue, a special issue of Military Affairs devoted to guerrilla warfare appeared in the spring of 1960. Col. Joseph P. Kutcher, who had taught military history at the U.S. Air Force Academy, wrote the lead article, entitled "Irregular Warfare in Transition." In commenting briefly on the Civil War, Kutcher insisted that, while both the claims and counterclaims for the success of the Confederacy’s guerrilla war had been exaggerated, the "effect and influence" of those operations had been "substantial" and merited "far more attention" from historians than they had received. Virgil Ney contributed an extensive bibliography on guerrilla operations to the issue. Some of the works he cited, like those by T. E. Lawrence, dated back to the 1920s, but the vast majority had been published in the 1940s and 1950s. Nearly all dealt with twentieth-century conflicts, too. Jones’s Gray Ghosts and Rebel Raiders was the only Civil War title to make his list.13

12 Grant, "Partisan Warfare," 56.
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But Civil War historians had received the boost they needed. Guerrillas were not only intrinsically fascinating, they now had historical relevance. Even familiar faces got a second look, as new work on John Hunt Morgan, Jesse James, Quantrill, and other notables expanded knowledge of Confederate guerrilla operations. Historians also paid more attention to the Union's anti-guerrilla strategy, thus implicitly recognizing the significance of the rebel threat. Interestingly, none of this work, save for a single issue of Civil War Times Illustrated, touched on Mosby or the Virginia partisans, which, along with Missouri, had always been a staple for guerrilla studies. Instead, in a trend that defied the entire historiography of the war, the western and trans-Mississippi theaters received increased attention through the 1970s and beyond, while Mosby and the Virginia partisans momentarily languished. Stephen Z. Starr, who would later establish himself as the leading authority on Union cavalry operations, wrote an excellent unit history of Jennison's Seventh Kansas Cavalry, better known as Jennison's Jayhawkers, and a refreshing amount of the literature explored guerrilla operations in Arkansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Tennessee, and West Virginia.  

A series of articles by Barnes F. Lathrop suggests the growing sophistication of guerrilla studies in this period. In 1960 and 1961, Lathrop, a professor at the University of Texas, published an extended essay about the early years of the war in Lafourche Parish, Louisiana. His work was notable for several reasons. First, he wrote about Louisiana, a state that few people had associated with the guerrilla war. Second, he framed and presented his story as a "problem in local defense," which the people of Lafourche tried to solve by waging partisan warfare. Third, he had no "legendary" characters. Rather, Lathrop told a story about

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unknown people—combatants and noncombatants alike—who resisted Federal invasion and the occupation of their community. It was a perfect melding of military and social history that explained how a single community had been worn down and overwhelmed by war.\textsuperscript{15}

Albert Castel became the acknowledged expert on Civil War guerrillas during the 1960s and 1970s. His bailiwick continued to be Kansas and Missouri, but Castel asked universal questions that had far-reaching implications. His most widely heralded work was a 1962 biography of Quantrill, which still has much to recommend it. Dudley Cornish praised the book as “a real contribution to the history of the border,” a needed corrective to earlier work that had either romanticized or condemned Quantrill. “Castel cuts through the underbrush of mythology and partisan condemnation,” Cornish elaborated, “to discover and explain the nature of a violent young man.”\textsuperscript{16}

Castel brought that same balanced judgment to an appraisal of a desperate Union effort to quash guerrilla warfare in Missouri. Most people who had written about the Missouri war had commented on Gen. Thomas Ewing’s General Orders No. 11. Issued in August 1863, the directive banished rebel sympathizers from a three-county region of western Missouri. Traditionally, the action had been interpreted as an act of retaliation for Quantrill’s raid on Lawrence. That was true, as far as it went, conceded Castel, but the order also revealed a hard edge to Union policy toward civilians that, except for William T. Sherman’s famous March to the Sea, had largely escaped the notice of historians. Castel called Ewing’s order “the harshest treatment ever imposed on United States citizens under the plea of military necessity,” with the exception, he added—ever mindful of recent events—of the internment of Japanese Americans during World War II.\textsuperscript{17}

Yet by the mid-1960s, an even more profound influence than World War II had begun to affect historical interpretations, not to mention American life generally: the Vietnam War. Subtle hints of that influence first appeared in language. Some authors, for example, used words like “insurgency” and “counterinsurgency” when writing about Confederate guerrillas, something they had not done before the 1960s. Other historians employed the war in Southeast Asia more directly. For example, Castel, playing off the old historical saw that the present can learn from the past, suggested that the operations of Quantrill’s


band could be used to understand the complexities of modern guerrilla warfare. He compared the principles articulated by the then current "master of partisan war," Mao Tse-tung, with the tactics of Quantrill and found that they matched perfectly. "It is perhaps not too farfetched to suggest," Castel concluded, "that if certain modern-day American civilians and military leaders had known a few facts about the guerrilla war on the Kansas–Missouri border in the 1860s, they might not have committed so many mistakes and experienced so many unpleasant surprises attempting to cope with the disciples of Ho Chi Minh in the 1960s."18

The Vietnam War suggested yet another path to be explored. Nearly all historians who sought to evaluate the tactics and strategies of guerrilla warfare, whatever the era, had been struck by the timeless elements in an essentially unsophisticated style of fighting. They had also been impressed by how effective a well-conducted guerrilla war could be. While earlier writers had pointed to the innovative tactics of Mosby, Forrest, and Quantrill and underscored the nuisance value of their raids and lightening attacks, no one had suggested that the Confederacy might have won the Civil War with a more broadly conceived partisan strategy. Indeed, Castel, at least, had implied just the opposite in his article about Mao and Quantrill.19 But as the Viet Cong seemed to gain the upper hand in Asia, not a few historians came to think that the Confederacy had squandered its best chance for victory.

The clearest statement of this position came from Robert L. Kerby, a professor at the University of Notre Dame and author of a substantial book about the trans-Mississippi Confederacy. In 1973, the year following publication of his book, Kerby wrote a provocative article entitled "Why the Confederacy Lost." He answered that perennial question by arguing that conservative rebel political and military leaders had failed to wage the guerrilla war of "national liberation" pursued so successfully by twentieth-century revolutionaries such as Mao, Che Guevara, Vo Nguyen Giap, and Ho Chi Minh. The refusal of rebel leaders to admit that they were engaged in a genuinely "revolutionary" contest, challenged Kerby, and their insistence that the war be waged by conventional means, compounded already serious logistical problems and manpower shortages, weakened public support for the government, and doomed their rebellion. "The Confederate government's disinclination to take seriously its own revolutionary rhetoric," he insisted, "was the chief factor which precipitated the disillusionment and demoralization of the white Southerners who believed in that rhetoric."20

19 Albert Castel, Winning and Losing in the Civil War: Essays and Stories (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1996), 133.
A heightened interest in worldwide guerrilla warfare during the 1970s seemed to verify Kerby’s analysis. Four excellent works on the guerrilla in history by Robert B. Asprey, John Ellis, N. I. Klonis, and Walter Laqueur appeared between 1972 and 1976. Unlike most surveys of guerrilla warfare published during the previous half century, the work of the 1970s did not stress tactical doctrine as much as the historical framework and legacy of what Asprey called “war in the shadows.” Only Klonis ventured to write “a comprehensive study” of irregular operations. Asprey sought only “to explain the Vietnam conflict in the historical terms of guerrilla warfare.” Ellis tried to treat “some of the occasions on which this mode of warfare has been used.” Laqueur wanted to “demythologize guerrilla warfare.” Yet each, to varying degrees, produced a solid historical introduction to the subject, and they all devoted space to the American Civil War.21

Albert Castel attempted a comprehensive history of Civil War guerrillas for a special issue of Civil War Times Illustrated in 1974. He surveyed the geographical sweep of the Confederacy, from Virginia to Texas. He emphasized the importance of irregular operations across the entire border region, including Kentucky, Tennessee, Maryland, and western Virginia, from the earliest days of the war. He featured the role of “urban guerrillas” in cities like Baltimore and St. Louis. He even estimated the number of men who served in the Confederacy’s partisan/guerrilla ranks. Yet, Castel failed to provide the sound interpretative analysis one might have hoped from him. This was partly a result of his intended audience, but it also underscored the fact that, despite many gains in guerrilla studies, historians did not yet have the building blocks or the theoretical framework necessary to construct a sturdy edifice. Treatment of the guerrilla war had come a long way, but it was still mired in “popular” history and had yet to win scholarly recognition as a legitimate field of research. Some graduate students, for example, had written about guerrillas, but, significantly, their work most often appeared as masters theses, rather than as substantial doctoral dissertations.22


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But that was changing, too. Don R. Bowen, a professor of political science at the University of Illinois, Chicago Circle, published two important articles in 1977 that analyzed the social origins and psychology of Missouri guerrillas. Interested neither in military tactics nor in the destructive force of the guerrilla war, Bowen employed entirely new techniques of analysis and cast the subject in a new light. He wanted to know "what types of persons" emerged as guerrilla leaders. Drawing on the insights of scholars like Eric J. Hobsbawn, Sigmund Neuman, H. D. Laswell, and Daniel Lerner, and constructing quantitative tables to illustrate such criteria as property holdings, occupation, age, and kinship ties, Bowen proposed a "local notable" hypothesis to explain the preeminence of men like Quantrill, George Todd, and Bill Anderson. Bowen also wanted to know why men became guerrillas, and he concluded that, in Missouri at least, "relative deprivation" best explained the guerrilla uprising. Missouri guerrillas were not the drags of society but the offspring of "a local rural elite" for whom Union occupation of the state "posed a distinct threat to their property, their status and, in not a few cases, their lives."23

Textbooks were much slower to incorporate the guerrilla war. The most widely used Civil War textbook of the 1970s, David H. Donald's revision of James C. Randall's 1937 work, The Civil War and Reconstruction, mentioned guerrillas barely at all, and Peter J. Parish's well received survey ignored the topic entirely. Only William L. Barney's Flawed Victory—significantly bearing the subtitle A New Perspective on the Civil War—took the issue seriously. In a chapter called "The People's War," Barney laid out the Confederacy's guerrilla operations and the Union response. His interpretation of guerrilla warfare remained limited in some respects. For instance, he recognized the significance of operations only in Missouri, West Virginia, and eastern Tennessee. But Barney also stressed that rebel guerrillas presented an "exasperating problem" for Union commanders, and he treated the whole issue with the seriousness it deserved.24

The third phase of study for the guerrilla war came in the 1980s and 1990s, and it began with Phillip Paludan. In 1981, several years before he called for a general history of the guerrilla war, Paludan complained that no historian had yet investigated the "social effect" of irregular warfare. Of course, even to suggest that this social impact might be worth investigating indicated how far guerrilla studies had come since the 1950s, but Paludan also offered an example of the work he had in mind. Victims: A True Story of the Civil War is a model study of the social impact of guerrilla conflict. The story revolves around the summery

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execution of thirteen unionist guerrillas by Confederate soldiers at Shelton Laurel, North Carolina, in early 1863; but the numbers, place, and time of the event are secondary. The significance of Paludan’s hard-hitting book grew from the human face it imposed on the brutality of guerrilla conflict and the marked sympathy it accorded the victims, rather than the purveyors, of guerrilla warfare.  

Scholars did not suddenly flock to Paludan’s banner, but a deeper appreciation for the totality of the guerrilla experience clearly gained ground over the next two decades. Indeed, while no one drew the distinction at the time, historians were coming to appreciate the difference between guerrilla warfare and the guerrilla war. The former dealt with the military operations, tactics, and organization of the guerrillas; the latter encompassed broader social themes that measured the impact of war on civilians and their communities. Barnes Lathrop had pointed in this direction twenty years earlier; Paludan endorsed his vision. John Keegan’s *Face of Battle.*, published in 1976, had helped, too, by showing in acceptable scholarly fashion that war is an ugly business. The television news brutality of Vietnam had also contributed with its graphic depiction of the upheaval and deadly intensity of a modern guerrilla war. Civil War historians blinked in the realization that their guerrilla sideshow possessed unexpected depths of enormous importance for understanding war in the 1860s.

Still, it took time to sort out all these nuances, and meanwhile, older traditions showed that they still had something to offer. In biography, Morgan and Quantrell led the way as subjects of multiple volumes about their lives and wartime exploits, and Mosby returned to the lists for the first time since the 1960s.  

Bloody Bill Anderson also received biographical treatment, and many previously under appreciated players, such as John Mobberly, Jeff Thompson, John J. Dickson, Sidney Jackman, Ezekiel Counts, Harry Gilmor, and John D. Imboden, had their stories told. Few of these men rated full-scale biographies, but the popular Civil War magazines that had proliferated since the centennial celebration regularly showcased articles about guerrilla leaders. More scholarly ap-

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praisals also appeared, if less frequently and in lesser numbers than in the popular press.28

Unit histories of partisan bands, though not numerous, offered another slant on the guerrilla war. The largest collection of such studies formed part of H. E. Howard's Virginia regimental series, which included volumes on Mosby's 43rd Battalion, McNeil's Rangers, Thurmond's Partisan Rangers, and the 24th Battalion Virginia Partisan Rangers. In addition, Jeffry D. Wert published a fine analysis of Mosby's men.29 Looking at the war from the other side, studies of unionist guerrilla and Federal anti-guerrilla units, most of them in the trans-Mississippi, also appeared. The most famous of the latter organizations was the Mississippi Marine Brigade, created in November 1862 to protect Union gunboats and transports against attacks by rebel guerrillas along the Mississippi River.30

The unit histories, particularly those that traced the evolution of Union anti-guerrilla operations, also reflected a much bigger concern. As historians took guerrillas more seriously, they found it necessary to place them in the context of broader wartime strategies and policies, both military and political, both Union and Confederate. Interestingly enough, most of this work focused on Union

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strategy, and especially on Federal efforts to cope with the Confederacy's guerrilla menace. Most notable were Archer Jones's *Civil War Command and Strategy* (1992) and Mark Grimsley's *Hard Hand of War* (1995), but other good work, much of it with a regional theme, also surfaced in journal articles and graduate theses and dissertations.\(^{31}\)

Another sure sign that the guerrilla war had escaped its reputation as a sideshow could be seen in the expanded geographical coverage accorded it. Dozens of new studies, most in the form of journal articles, measured the impact of guerrilla operations on individual communities and states, all of which produced a more intricate picture of the guerrilla conflict. Arkansas, Georgia, Kansas, Kentucky, North Carolina, Tennessee, Louisiana, and Texas received particular attention, and at least three studies—two of them collections of essays—compared states or regions of the South. Some authors stressed military operations, others the collision between guerrillas and civilians, still others the social and political motives of guerrillas. Different authors pursued different themes, although the best work explained the interplay of factors. The newest and most exciting wrinkle came from historians who described the struggle between rival bands of southern unionists and Confederates for control of the home front, an approach that suggested an even wider range of guerrilla operations.\(^{32}\)


Amidst this expanded geographical coverage, two works stood out as especially valuable. Most pivotal was Michael Fellman's *Inside War: The Guerrilla Conflict in Missouri during the American Civil War*, published in 1989. Fellman offered the most sophisticated analysis to date of the nature of the guerrilla war, particularly its impact on noncombatants. He explored every aspect of the struggle, including motives for joining guerrilla bands, the clash between unionist and secessionist neighbors, official governmental responses—both Federal and Confederate—to guerrilla operations, interaction between rebel guerrillas and Union troops, the roles of women and blacks, and the impact on families and communities. Astonishingly, he was the first scholar to conduct significant research on the guerrilla war in archival manuscript collections, including those of the National Archives. The result, a grimly realistic account of the raw, unregulated, no-holds-barred nature of the contest, exposed the horrific guts of war. There had been nothing like it in guerrilla studies.\(^{33}\)

The strength of Fellman's approach came from his sophisticated weaving of historical events with the diverse and complex sociological and psychological undercurrents of the guerrilla war. He went beyond the confining narrative of historians like Brownlee and Castel to propel the field in analytical directions more in tune with Bowen and Paludan. For Missourians, he emphasized, the issue of the nation's struggle was not secession, or emancipation, or any similar political goal, but, rather, the survival of their culture. The collected crises of these Missourians, battered and abused though they may have been by the upheaval of war, produced a far larger "cultural crisis." Equally telling, Fellman stepped back from the numbing daily brutality of events in Missouri to comment on the broader roles of violence, honor, fantasy, courage, fear, and revenge in the psychology of war. His book became a model for studying the war's guerrilla dynamic elsewhere in the Confederacy, and it has influenced all subsequent state studies, including, most recently, those by Benjamin Franklin Cooling and Noel C. Fisher.\(^{34}\)

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35 Benjamin Franklin Cooling, *Fort Donelson's Legacy: War and Society in Kentucky and Tennessee, 1862–1865* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1997); Noel C. Fisher, *War at Every
Also useful, though in ways different from Fellman, was Stephen V. Ash’s *When the Yankees Came: Conflict and Chaos in the Occupied South, 1861–1865*, published in 1995. Ash did not write about guerrillas *per se*. Indeed, his carefully drawn analysis of Union occupation excluded several regions—Missouri, Kentucky, West Virginia, and East Tennessee—where the guerrilla war raged with particular ferocity. But he did provide a framework with which to assess how different parts of the South reacted variously to such wartime pressures as the guerrilla conflict. By stressing the resistance efforts of southerners behind the lines, where both rebel and unionist guerrillas played prominent roles, Ash joined Fellman in deromanticizing war and demanding that the South’s civilian population be accorded a more prominent place in the war’s story. Ash also took tentative steps toward that still elusive comprehensive analysis of the guerrilla war by noting geographical differences in its origins and discussing the motives and *modus operandi* of rebel guerrillas.35

The textbooks reflected the times by increasing their coverage of guerrillas. James M. McPherson’s *Battle Cry of Freedom*, the most widely read general history of the Civil War in the 1980s and 1990s, acknowledged that rebel irregulars “tied down large numbers of Union troops in the border states” during the first year of fighting. By 1864, he said of the war in Missouri, a few thousand guerrillas “tied down tens of thousands of Union soldiers and militia who might otherwise have fought elsewhere.” Other surveys, including those by Charles P. Roland, Herman Hattaway, and Brooks D. Simpson, also took seriously the guerrilla war, although, like McPherson, they tended to consider only operations in the border states. Another form of recognition came when the popular *Time-Life* history of the war, published in the 1980s, devoted an entire volume to irregular warfare. In addition, the authoritative *Encyclopedia of the Confederacy*, published in 1993, included a seven page entry on “Guerrilla Warfare,” a degree of coverage unthinkable a decade earlier.36

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The accumulated weight of all this attention would have astonished and amused Bruce Catton: The guerrilla war had become controversial. The growing literature had forced historians to consider more seriously the impact of irregular operations on the larger war. The question had now become, what kind of impact? On civilians and the home front? As a source of physical destruction, of psychological and emotional trauma? In altering the conduct of the war? As a force in shaping Confederate and Union military policy? And why did men—and a few women—become guerrillas? Don Bowen, in a 1988 article that expanded his earlier “relative deprivation” thesis, suggested that rebel guerrillas in Missouri fought a “counter” revolution against the North—or a “nationalist” uprising against an army of “occupation”—to maintain their own social positions and the stability of their communities. Yet Fellman, a year later, and looking at the same state, emphasized motives of revenge, the sanctity of communities, and what he called “blood sport.”

All of these questions deserved answers, but the issue that sparked the most debate concerned the success of Confederate guerrillas. Should the rebels have used guerrilla forces more extensively? Or, phrased somewhat differently, could the Confederacy have won a guerrilla war, and if not before Appomattox, then after? Robert Kerby had responded “yes” in 1973, and historians in the third historiographical phase of guerrilla studies lined up either to endorse or refute him. Scholars who examined the guerrilla conflict at the community or state level seldom expressed doubts about its effectiveness in the microcosm, but those who viewed events in a wider arena expressed mixed opinions. The strongest endorsement for Kerby’s interpretation came from the quartet of Richard E. Beringer, Herman Hattaway, Archer Jones, and William N. Still Jr. They declared in their landmark 1987 book, Why the South Lost the Civil War: “The Confederates’ refusal to consider the guerrilla alternative may be a reason why the South lost the Civil War.” Not many people agreed with them. Charles Roland asserted that too many obstacles hampered the pursuit of an effective guerrilla strategy, and other scholars, including Reid Mitchell, George M. Fredrickson, and Gary W. Gallagher, sided with Roland.


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Of course, that did not resolve the issue. For one thing, historians who thought the guerrilla option would not have worked did not agree on why it would not work; nor, in truth, did anyone present a substantial enough body of evidence to cinch any particular case. Equally important, nearly everyone, whether or not they agreed with the Kerby thesis, missed a more important question: Was there ever a time when the Confederacy could have better employed its guerrilla forces, when the added weight of irregular warfare might have made a difference? That question also wants a convincing answer.39

And there is no shortage of other gaps in the story. More work is needed on the socioeconomic origins of guerrilla warfare, the attitudes of civilians toward guerrillas, Federal anti-guerrilla operations, unionist guerrillas and their relation to organized anti-guerrilla efforts, community and state studies of the guerrilla war (especially in the lower South), comparative regional studies, guerrilla activities on southern rivers, the impact of the guerrilla war on slavery, and the legacy of the guerrilla war for postwar violence and outlawry. A particularly disappointing failure has been the almost total absence of guerrillas from the many fine recent works that have treated the common soldier. Scholars—like the Union and Confederate governments—seem reluctant to accord irregulars their status as legitimate fighting men.40 It would also be fascinating to see how guerrillas viewed their own actions, how they perceived their wartime roles during and after the conflict, and how Confederate guerrillas fit into the mythology of the Lost Cause.

So the fun has really just begun. The guerrilla war is a new realm open to every avenue of approach. Hardly any aspect of it has been settled or agreed on, other than that it was more widespread and waged even more bitterly than we supposed. America's guerrilla war remains an important part of more general studies of irregular warfare, too. Indeed, recent work, responding to the weight

39 A tentative answer and a broader discussion of the issues to be considered may be found in Daniel E. Sutherland, "Without Mercy, and Without the Blessing of God," *North and South* 1 (Sept. 1995): 12–21.

of new material being produced by Civil War historians, accords it substantially more importance than did earlier surveys. Perhaps the most important challenge is to determine its role in the larger war and to integrate it more smoothly into general accounts of the war, both as it affected military strategy and policy and as it shaped life on the southern home front. That story, when told, must be unflinching, too, told after the fashion of Paludan and Fellman, with all of its darkest recesses fully exposed. We now know that the guerrilla war was much more than a sideshow, but having said that, we must find its appropriate niche in the great war.

41 Ioes. Guerrilla Conflict Before the Cold War. 125-77.